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Abstract
Micro data from a dental insurance natural experiment is used to analyze
why agents opt out of insurance. The purpose is to relate the dropout decision
to new information on risk, acquired by the policy holder and the insurer. The
results show that agents tend to leave the insurance when reclassi￿ed into higher
premium classes, or when experiencing unexpectedly low dental care utilization
within the insurance. They are more responsive to higher premiums than to lower
expected utilization. The results show updating on dental risk to be asymmetric,
giving agents and insurer partly di⁄erent information sets. Higher premiums are
viewed as higher prices of insurance rather than fair risk reassessments. Agents
do not take the insurer￿ s information fully into account, even though it is public.
The decision is also based on old information.
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surance.
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Asymmetric information in insurance markets may reduce the extent of insurance cov-
erage and thereby induce welfare costs. In a survey of the empirical literature, Chi-
appori and SalaniØ (2003) ￿nd the extent of asymmetric information to vary across
di⁄erent types of insurance markets. Testing the extent of asymmetric information in
health insurances, and whether agents act on informational advantages, is therefore
important in order to determine the viability of health insurance markets. Already
Akerlof (1970) noted that adverse selection can motivate public intervention in health
insurance markets.
The evidence of adverse selection in health insurance is mixed. Most empirical
studies on health insurance markets use cross-sectional data to observe whether the
market equilibrium has properties consistent with adverse selection; see, for example,
Savage and Wright (2003), Sapelli and Vial (2003), Thomasson (2002), and Cardon
and Hendel (2001). Little is however learned about the dynamics of adverse selection.
Testing how agents react to exogenous shocks can be one strategy for capturing
the evolution of an adverse selection externality. Changes in the incentive structure
can be one such shock. Bauchmeuller and DiNardo (2002) study the dynamics of the
health insurance market in New York State when mandatory community rating was
implemented in some segments. They ￿nd that healthier agents are more prone to
switch into less generous policies, i.e. HMO plans. In a similar way, Cutler and Reber
(1998) study the evolution of selection in health plans o⁄ered to Harvard employees
following a price reform, where the marginal price of coverage was increased. They
observe that younger and healthier agents tend to switch from more generous to less
generous insurance policies, rather than older and less healthy agents switching in the
opposite direction. One remarkable result is the potential speed of an adverse selection
death spiral as the most generous health plan collapsed only three years after the price
reform. In a similar vein, Nicholson, Bundorf, Stein and Polsky (2003) study health
care spending among individuals switching between HMO and non-HMO plans. They
￿nd that individuals switching from a non-HMO to a HMO plan used 11 percent less
resources prior to switching, than those remaining in the non-HMO plan. Individuals
switching from an HMO to a non-HMO plan, on the other hand, used 18 percent more
1resources prior to switching than those staying within the HMO.
The way that the contracting parties are updating their information on risk has con-
sequences for the persistence of information asymmetries. If updating is asymmetric,
either one party may gain an informational advantage over time, or the existing asym-
metries will be reduced. There is some indirect evidence about the learning process
on health risks. Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) ￿nd the premium pro￿les on the US life
insurance market to be consistent with a model of symmetric learning and commit-
ment from the insurer on reclassi￿cation risk. Crocker and Moran (2003), in turn, ￿nd
evidence that the coverage in employer-based health plans is consistent with a model of
symmetric learning and friction in the mobility between jobs. The empirical research
on how insurers and policy holders update their information on health risks is limited,
however.
In this study, micro data is used to analyze why agents opt out of insurance, in a
setting where the premium can be changed due to risk reclassi￿cation. The purpose is
to analyze how the decision to leave insurance coverage is related to new information
on risk acquired by the policy holder and the insurer.
The data comes from a dental insurance natural experiment provided by the Na-
tional Dental Service1 in the county of V￿rmland, Sweden. The insurance was intro-
duced in 1999, and o⁄ers full-coverage during a two-year contract period. After the
initial contract period, 9.6 percent of the policyholders decided not to renew their in-
surance. This decision is here related to new information on dental health. The results
indicate that the updating of information is asymmetric. Policy holders tend to view a
higher premium, due to reclassi￿cation of risk, as a price increase, rather than a signal
of worse dental health. They also tend to be more responsive to higher premiums than
to private signals of changed dental risk.
The next section gives a description of the institutional setting and the data. Section
three presents a simple theoretical framework for insurance lapsation when information
is asymmetrically updated. The empirical results are presented in section four, and
the ￿nal section contains the concluding remarks.
1Folktandv￿rden.
22 Empirical Setting
Dental care in Sweden is provided by both private, mainly self-employed, dentists and
the National Dental Service. From the year an individual turns 20, he is covered
by a public dental insurance scheme, to which both private and public dentists are
a¢ liated.2 The public dental insurance was initially designed as a progressive subsidy,
with a coverage up to 80 percent of dental costs. Over time, the generosity of the
scheme has gradually been reduced in an e⁄ort to cut public spending on dental care,
making individuals more exposed to the risk of high dental costs. Since 1999, the
subsidy is linear, covering around 30 percent of all dental costs (Olsson, 1999).
2.1 Dental Insurance with Risk Reassessment
To counteract the increased risk exposure, the National Dental Service in V￿rmland,
Sweden, introduced a voluntary insurance, in January 1999, where dental patients were
o⁄ered to subscribe to dental care.3 The term insurance is not explicitly used by the
National Dental Service, but the subscription is in e⁄ect a full-coverage voluntary dental
insurance provided by a public monopolist. At a ￿xed annual fee, the subscription
provides free dental services during a two-year contract period. It is important to note
that dentists within the National Dental Service are employed with a ￿xed salary and
have no direct private interest in the insurance.
The subscription fee is set after an oral examination of the patient. The oral
examination evaluates dental risk in four dimensions (general risk, technical risk, caries
risk, and parodental risk) and for each dimension there are 6 to 8 risk indicators, where
each indicator is rated on a four-graded scale. The risk indicators for each dimension
are summed up, and patients are clustered into one of 16 risk classes based on this sum.
Contracts are then priced according to risk class. The risk classi￿cation is assessing
patients￿dental health. Dental health never improves, so a patient being upgraded to
a higher risk class has experienced a deterioration in his dental health and is viewed
as a higher risk. Any downgrading of a patient to a lower risk class follows from
new information indicating that the initial classi￿cation was erroneous. The National
2Dental care is provided free of charge for individuals below the age of 20.
3For patients aged 20, the insurance was o⁄ered from September 1998.
3Dental Service only uses these risk indicators when assessing risk, and does not take
realized dental costs explicitly into account.
In 1999, around 60 percent of all patients registered with the National Dental Ser-
vice in V￿rmland had a valid risk classi￿cation, and were thus given the opportunity to
purchase insurance. About 23 percent of these patients￿ roughly 7,000 individuals￿
purchased a dental subscription in 1999. The introduction of the dental insurance in
1999 constitutes an ideal situation for studying adverse selection, as no private insur-
ance was available to these individuals before 1999. It was also unanticipated from the
patients￿perspective, making dental care utilization exogenous to the insurance deci-
sion. The launch of the dental plan thus constitutes a natural experiment. The initial
decision of whether to purchase insurance is analyzed by Gr￿nqvist (2004), and results
di⁄er across risk classes. The estimated evidence of adverse selection is concentrated
to high risk classes. Within low risk classes, however, there is evidence consistent with
advantageous selection; here, the probability of purchasing dental insurance is increas-
ing with lower expected dental consumption. This latter ￿nding is consistent with
￿ndings of Cawley and Philipson (1999) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2003). The
results can be explained by heterogeneity in both risk aversion and the e⁄ectiveness of
prevention, in a model similar to that of de Meza and Webb (2001), where the level
of self-protection increases with risk aversion. The overall evidence from the initial
decision to purchase insurance, or not, suggests that adverse selection may not be a
problem at the aggregate level.
The introduction of the dental insurance in 1999 also creates a setting for studying
selection in terms of insurance lapsation. After the two-year contract period, agents
must decide whether to continue their subscription for another contract period. Before
the insurance can be renewed, patients have their dental risk, and thus their premium,
reassessed by the dental service. It turns out that about 10 percent of those agents
who found the insurance worth purchasing in 1999 choose not to renew it in 2001.4
Thus, there must be some new circumstance that makes these agents reconsider their
initial decision. Within this dental insurance setting, it is possible to link the decision
to lapse from the insurance to proxies of new information. The new information on
4This number is net of agents who die or leave the county during the period.
4risk, received by the insurer, cannot be directly observed but can be inferred through
the up-grading, or down-grading, of agents into new risk classes.
For agents, dental care consumed within the insurance is used as a proxy for new
private information. Consumption of dental care and dental cost has a high correlation
over time (see, for example, Powell 1998). A person with a history of prior caries has
a higher probability of getting new problems. Bacteria will easily grow if the enamel
has been coarsened by prior caries, or will grow in the seam between a prior ￿lling
and the tooth. A ￿lled tooth will also need future maintenance or replacement, and
will be more fragile. Past dental consumption is thus a good predictor of dental risk
and future dental consumption. Consequently, if agents have private information, this
could be proxied with past costs, since the National Dental Service in V￿rmland does
not explicitly use realized dental costs in their risk assessment. So, if an agent has an
unexpectedly high (low) dental consumption within the insurance, he can be viewed as
receiving a signal of the dental risk being higher (lower) than his prior expectations.
The risk classi￿cation is assessing the long run risk level, not explicitly the expected
expenditures during the upcoming two-year contract period. Asymmetric information
in this setting may also result from dental consumption potentially following cyclical
patterns longer than the two-year contract period. The idea being that high dental
consumption, e.g. from investing in a denture, would be followed by a period of low
expenditures before the denture needs to be repaired or replaced.
An important question at this stage is whether past dental consumption contains
any private information on dental risk, as oral examinations are used by the National
Dental Service in V￿rmland to assess dental risk. To this end, a validity test of the
proxy for private information, and whether it is due to a cyclical pattern in dental
consumption, is performed. Dental cost for the two years 2000 to 2001 is regressed on
dental costs during the two preceding years (1998-1999) and on dummy variables for
each of the 16 risk classes. Dental costs for the additional preceding two-year period,
1996 to 1997, are also added to the analysis to capture the long run patterns of dental
consumption. If the proxy contains private information, dental consumption during the
preceding two years should explain costs in the upcoming two-year period, in excess
of the risk classi￿cation system. The test is performed on the agents not buying the
5insurance within the period 1999 to 2001 (n=36 241). The reason for using this group
is that dental care within the insurance may be guided by clinical guidelines related to
risk classes, thus generating a spurious relation.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 reports that past dental costs, 1998 to 1999, alone explain 9 percent of
future costs, whereas the risk classi￿cation system alone explains 11 percent of the
variation5. The risk classes are better predictors of future dental costs and contain
more information on dental risk than do past costs. When both past dental costs,
1998 to 1999, and the risk classes are used as regressors, 14 percent of the variation in
costs in 2000 to 2001 is explained. Hence, a large part, but not all, of the information
contained in past dental consumption is also captured by the risk classi￿cation system.
There is still scope for private information to act on. Past dental consumption cap-
tures an additional 27 percent (3 percentage points) of the variation in future dental
costs not captured by the risk classi￿cation system. The coe¢ cient on Cost 98-99 is
positive, demonstrating that high dental consumption during the previous two-year
period indicates higher dental care expenditures in the next two years. This rejects the
notion that any private information would be due to cyclical patterns in dental con-
sumption not captured by the risk classi￿cation system. Instead the predictive power
would be due to the anatomy of dental problems giving a positive correlation over time.
Next, when dental consumption for the period 1996 to 1997 is added to the analysis
the explanatory power increases; 16 percent of the variation in dental costs 2000 to
2001 is explained. The predictive power of Cost 96-97, in excess of Cost 98-99 and
the risk classi￿cation, indicates that there is a cyclical component in dental care, even
if this component does not explain predictive power of the chosen proxy for private
information.
5For risk classes 14 to 16 the coe¢ cients do not follow the increasing pattern expected for higher
risk classes. This is due to the low number of patients, 229 out of the 36 241 (0.64 percent), belonging
to any of the top three risk classes in the chosen sample. Chance thus has a larger scope.
62.2 Data
Data comes from an administrative database on dental care. The sample consists of
those patients who started to subscribe to dental care in 1999, and who were registered
with the dental service in V￿rmland during the period 1997 to 2001.6 Patients need to
be registered until 2001, so that they can be observed throughout the contract period.
They also need to be registered from 1997, so that their dental consumption can be
tracked during the two-year period before the insurance purchase.
The sample consists of 5998 patients, of whom 9.6 percent, or 575 individuals,
choose to drop out after the initial two-year contract period. Policy holders are mainly
clustered in the low- and middle-risk classes, with over 90 percent of the individuals in
the sample belonging to the eight lowest risk classes. None of the policy holders in the
sample belong to any of the three top risk classes (14-16). The decision to opt-out is
slightly increasing with higher risk classes.
[Table 2 about here]
Private information on risk is proxied with past dental costs. The variable pre-
cost contains the cost of dental care during the two-year period prior to the insurance
purchase7 and gives a measure of agents￿private information at the time when the
initial decision to sign-up was made. di⁄-cost, in turn, captures the signal received by
the agent during the insurance period and it is de￿ned as the cost of dental care within
the insurance minus pre-cost.8 A high value of di⁄-cost indicates an unexpectedly
high dental consumption, as compared to the prior period. Pre-cost and di⁄-cost are
6Patients aged 20 in 1998 were given the o⁄er already in September 1998, as part of a pilot project.
These patients are included in the sample, even if they bought the insurance at the end of 1998. In
this case, however, they need to have been registered with the National Dental Service since 1996, but
need not be registered in 2001.
7Pre-cost is the amount charged by the National Service in V￿rmland, and calculated by applying
the gross price list to procedures chargeable to patients.
8Dental care within the insurance is not registered as speci￿c procedures. Instead, it is registered
within broader groups of procedures and as the time used by the relevant sta⁄ category (dentist,
hygienist, nurse). To calculate dental cost, the time usage is summed up using the time tari⁄. From
1999, there are, however, no explicit time tari⁄s for hygienist and nurse services. These are calculated
as fractions of the time tari⁄ for dentists, using the price list in 1995 to 1998 as a key.
7measured in SEK (1 SEK = 0.128 USD in January 1999)
The signal received by the dental service can be inferred from the risk reclassi￿cation
and is measured as premium changes in SEK, so di⁄-prem is measured in the same
units as di⁄-cost and is directly comparable in numbers. The variable di⁄-prem only
includes premium changes due to patients being reclassi￿ed into higher or lower risk
classes, and does not capture the general price increase over all risk classes. Between
January 1999 and May 2001, all premiums increased by 11 percent. Consumer prices
increased by 5 percent during the same period, while the general price level for medical
and dental services increased by 16 percent (Statistics Sweden).
The data also includes information on patients￿age and gender. The decision to
opt out may be in￿ uenced by the attitudes of the treating dentist. To capture this
in￿ uence, a dummy variable for each of the 43 clinics is used. Descriptive statistics of
the variables are displayed in table 2.
3 Dropout under Asymmetric Updating
If agents lapse in their insurance coverage, there must be some new circumstance that
makes the insurance no longer worth buying. There may be a number of reasons
for opting out; premiums may have increased due to higher loading or higher dental
consumption due to moral hazard. Also, policy-holders￿wealth circumstances or their
degree of risk aversion may have changed. The focus here, however, is how the decision
to opt out is related to new information on risk and whether updating of information
is asymmetric. The decision to opt out is viewed as a response to new information on
risk obtained by the insurer and the policyholder, in a setting that captures the dental
insurance in V￿rmland.
3.1 Dropout Decision
Agents are assumed to live in a world where they face the risk of a ￿nancial loss, and
where an insurer o⁄ers a full coverage insurance. Neither the agent nor the insurer have
perfect knowledge of the risk level, but make an assessment of the risk. The policy is
priced based on the insurer￿ s inference of the agent￿ s risk level.
8For an agent to ￿nd a full coverage insurance worth buying, it must give him an
assured wealth level, Zi, at least as high as the certainty equivalence, CEi. Hence, if
the agent initially bought the insurance in the beginning of period 0 then CEi0 < Zi0.
During period 0 both the agent and the insurer receive new information, making
them reassess the agent￿ s risk level. If the agent decides to opt out at the beginning of
period 1, at least one part￿ the agent or the insurer￿ must have obtained new infor-
mation on the agent￿ s risk level. If the learning process is symmetric the agent adjusts
his willingness to pay for the insurance by the same amount as the insurer changes
the premium, and there is no lapsation due to updating. If signals are asymmetric, on
the other hand, agents may in fact discontinue their insurances; either (i) when the
agent lowers the assessed risk level more than the insurer does, or (ii) when the insurer
receives a signal to raise the assessed risk level and it is not matched by the signal
received by the agent. In both cases the insurance becomes relatively more expensive
from the agent￿ s perspective.
In the ￿rst situation, the agent gets a signal indicating that his risk is lower than
expected, reducing his assessed risk level at the beginning of period 1. With a lower
perceived risk, his cost of being uninsured is reduced, implying that CEi1 > CEi0. If
the insurer also gets a signal indicating the agent having lower risk, the updated risk
assessment will make him reduce the insurance premium, thereby increasing the wealth
level assured by the insurance Zi1 > Zi0. Whether the agent will continue to purchase
insurance in period 1 depends on the size of these signals. If the signal received by
the agent is su¢ ciently large relative that of the insurer, the certainty equivalent will
become larger than the wealth assured by insurance, CEi1 > Zi1. Thus, even if the
premium has been reduced, the agent will no longer ￿nd the insurance worth its price,
and will opt out.
In the second situation, the insurer receives a signal to raise the assessed risk level
not matched by the agent. The updated risk assessment will make the insurer raise
the insurance premium for period 1, which implies that the wealth assured by having
insurance is reduced, Zi1 < Zi0. If the agent also gets a signal during period 0 indicating
that the risk level is higher than anticipated he will be willing to purchase a more
expensive insurance in period 1, CEi1 < CEi0. When the signal received by the insurer
9is su¢ ciently large relative to that received by the agent, the income with insurance
will become lower than the certainty equivalent, CEi1 > Zi1. The price of the insurance
has increased more than what the agent is willing to accept, so he drops out.
If the responsiveness to signals is not su¢ ciently large, however, or if asymmetric
updating makes the policy relatively cheaper from the agent￿ s perspective, he will not
opt out.
3.2 Dropout consequences
Insurance lapsation due to updating follows from signals of new information being
asymmetric in a certain way. The consequences of insurance dropout depend on the
quality of new information.
At signals indicating better than expected health, agents only lapse their contract
if they reduce the assessed risk level more than the insurer. The agents opting out
are those believing that they have lower risk than previously expected. If this belief
is correct, lapsation will lead to problems of adverse selection, since the risks opting
out are the good ones. If the signal is false￿ and the insurer￿ s assessment is more
correct￿ there will be no problems of adverse selection.
When new information indicates higher risk, on the other hand, there is only lap-
sation if the insurer increases the assessed risk level more than the agent does. If the
insurer￿ s reassessment is correct, the self-selection out of insurance occurs because the
insurer has improved on its risk classi￿cation, which can be viewed as reducing the
problems of adverse selection. If, however, the insurer￿ s signal is erroneous￿ and the
agent￿ s assessment is more correct￿ the risks opting out are the good ones, thereby
aggravating the problem of adverse selection.
Hence, lapsation will lead to adverse selection, if agents￿risk reassessment is more
accurate than that of the insurer, irrespective of whether lapsation follows from good
or bad news. Adverse selection has negative welfare consequences as the scope of
coverage provided by the market is reduced, potentially eliminating the insurance in a
death spiral.
Now, even if the insurer￿ s reassessment is more correct, agents lapsing their contract
imply an ine¢ ciency as risk averse agents always take a fair insurance. Agents here
10opt out even though the policy becomes more fair, and also fairer than their preferred
policy.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
If a patient gains from not renewing the contract, UI < UNI, there is some new
information that makes him reconsider his initial decision. The decision on whether to
opt out is related to signals on risk and analyzed with a binary choice model.
With symmetric learning, the decision to opt out of insurance is not related to
signals of new information; that is, if the insurer gets a signal indicating the risk level
of an agent to be higher than expected, he will raise the agent￿ s premium accordingly.
The agent, in turn, will regard the increase in the premium as fair and will not opt out,
as he receives an equivalent signal. Likewise, if the agent receives a signal indicating
lower risk, his willingness to pay for insurance is reduced. The agent will still not opt
out as the insurance premium is accordingly reduced, while the insurer receives an
equivalent signal. The hypothesis of symmetric updating can be tested by estimating
the following model











and testing for g1 = 0, where S
j
i0 for j = I;A is the signal of new information received
during period 0 by the insurer and the agent, respectively. Positive (negative) values
on the signal implies that new information indicate the risk to be larger (smaller)
than expected. P
j
i0 for j = I;A is the prior on risk in the beginning of period 0 for
the insurer and the agent, respectively, and "i1 is the error term in the econometric
model. Individual speci￿c reasons for opting out￿ other than asymmetric updating￿
are captured by the error term, assuming them to be independent of the signals of
new information. The general tendency to opt out is captured by the constant term
in the regression model. The covariate vector Xi contains age and gender to capture
socioeconomic and behavioral di⁄erences, and a dummy variable for each clinic to
capture potential di⁄erences in praxis style. If g1 = 0 cannot be rejected agents lapse
their coverage for reasons other than asymmetric updating.
If the hypothesis of symmetric learning is rejected, asymmetric updating is studied
11by estimating the following model













In the dental insurance setting, the signal received by the insurer is not really
private. It can be inferred by observing the premium changes due to risk reclassi￿cation.
These signals are thus public and available to the agents. If an agent believes the insurer
to be guided by new and valid information, he should incorporate this information and
only act on his private information. That is, the decision on whether to opt out should
not be in￿ uenced by premium change, as this change re￿ ects new information on risk
obtained by the insurer. If agents incorporate the insurer￿ s signal in addition to their
private signals, the marginal e⁄ects will be f1 < 0 and f2 = 0.
Now, if the agent does not￿ or only partly￿ incorporate information obtained by
the insurer, the contracting parts will have disjoint information sets if updating is
asymmetric, and the marginal e⁄ects will be f1 < 0 and f2 > 0. The two situations
where asymmetric updating lead to lapsation generate the same reduced-form pre-
dictions. In both cases the insurance policy becomes relatively more expensive from
the agent￿ s perspective. (i) When the new information indicates that the agent has a
higher risk than expected, he will opt out if the premium increase is higher than the
increase in his willingness-to-pay. That is, the higher the insurer￿ s signal, conditional
on the agent￿ s signal, the greater is the likelihood of the agent opting out. (ii) When
new information reveals that the agent has lower risk than expected, the agent opts
out if his willingness-to-pay is reduced more than the premium. That is, the lower the
agent￿ s signal, conditional on the insurers signal, the greater is the likelihood of the
agent opting out.
To analyze whether the response to asymmetric updating is the same when pre-
miums are not reduced su¢ ciently as when premiums are raised too much, dropout
behavior is analyzed separately for premium decreases and increases.
From the reduced form model it is not possible to determine who has the informa-
tional advantage, only whether updating is asymmetric or not.
124 Results
A ￿rst conclusion from the empirical results is that the hypothesis of symmetric up-
dating is not supported by the data. In model 1, table 3, the decision to opt out of
insurance is regressed only on the proxy for the insurer￿ s signal, i.e. di⁄-prem, and not
on the signal received by agents, i.e. di⁄-cost. Dummy variables for each risk group
and previous dental costs are included to control for the information available at the
time of the initial decision to enter the insurance. In addition, the e⁄ect of age, gender,
and variation across clinics (fe clinics) are controlled for. The results show di⁄-prem
to be positive and highly signi￿cant. Agents are more likely to drop out when the
insurer increases its assessment of the risk level. Replacing di⁄-prem by di⁄-cost in
model 2 gives similar results; di⁄-cost is negative and signi￿cant. Agents receiving a
signal of risk being lower than expected are more likely to drop out, indicating that
the premium is not accordingly reduced. Had learning on risk been symmetric, these
signals would not have been signi￿cant.
[Table 3 about here]
To identify the determinants of selection out from insurance, both di⁄-prem and
di⁄-cost are included as explanatory variables in model 3. Both variables are signi￿cant,
and the responsiveness to di⁄-prem is more than three times as large as to di⁄-cost.
This rejects the hypothesis that agents deduce the insurer￿ s signal through the observed
risk reclassi￿cation, and then append this additional information to their information
sets. Instead, agents and insurer have, at least in part, di⁄erent information sets. The
higher responsiveness to di⁄-prem may be due to higher premium representing a loss
with certainty, while a lower di⁄-cost represents uncertain gains in risk. Increases and
decreases in premiums are included as separate variables in model 4, table 4. The
parameter estimate for premium increases is considerably larger than the estimate for
reductions, but the di⁄erence does not reach signi￿cance (p-value = 0:210). A premium
increase, net of private signals, is at least partly regarded by agents as a price increase,
rather than a fair risk reassessment. The risk reclassi￿cation by dentists is based on
speci￿c risk indicators within the scope of an oral examination, and the outcome is
available to patients via their dentist. Therefore, it would have been natural if patients
13had seen this risk reassessment as legitimate and based on objective criteria.
[Table 4 about here]
The responsiveness of new information may di⁄er across risk classes, as the relative
impact of a Krona￿ s worth of change in premium and dental consumption di⁄ers. Dif-
ferent slopes are therefore allowed for low, medium, and high risk classes, where the
four lowest risk classes are de￿ned as low, classes 5 to 8 as medium, and risk classes 9
to 13 as high. In model 5, table 4, where di⁄erent slopes are allowed for di⁄-prem, the
e⁄ect does not di⁄er between high and low risk classes. Di⁄-prem is positive and signif-
icant throughout. The hypothesis of equal slopes cannot be rejected (p-value = 0:458);
higher premiums are viewed as the same type of price increases, regardless of risk class.
For di⁄-cost, on the other hand, the e⁄ect di⁄ers across risk classes (p-value = 0:031).
In low risk classes, high values of di⁄-cost will reduce the probability of lapsation more
than in high risk classes.
A noteworthy result is that pre-cost￿ agents￿information at the time of the initial
insurance decision￿ is negative and signi￿cant. Lower dental cost prior to purchasing
insurance increases the probability of opting out. This information was available al-
ready in the decision to sign-up, and should therefore have no bearing on the decision
to lapse the insurance.
Another remarkable result is that the constant term is increasing with higher risk
classes; that is, controlling for the e⁄ect of both old and new information, agents in
higher risk classes have higher probabilities of opting out. During the period, all risk
classes were subject to a proportional price increase (11 percent between January 1999
and June 2001), which translates into larger out-of-pocket costs for higher risk groups.
One interpretation would be that patients are more sensitive to larger nominal premium
increases, being liquidity constrained.
The probability of opting out of insurance is reduced with higher age, the interpre-
tation of which is ambiguous. It can be that age contains information on changes in
risk that is neither captured in the risk classi￿cation nor in past dental consumption.
It can also be the case that the propensity to insure risk increases with age. Moreover,
men are less likely to opt out than women.
14[Table 5 about here]
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[Table 7 about here]
The results can also be captured by depicting the typical patient lapsing the in-
surance. Table 5 reports that the National Dental Service in V￿rmland makes larger
pro￿ts on patients that opt out,9 which implies that, on average, patients opting out
have lower dental costs than their peers in the same risk class. Patients who opt out
also receive higher average premium increases, as seen in table 6. However, considering
all patients receiving higher premiums, in table 7, it is seen that the pro￿t on these
agents is negative. For patients remaining in the same risk class, the pro￿t is positive,
and positive and still higher for patients reclassi￿ed into a lower risk class. Hence,
patients upgraded to a higher risk class are, on average, those having generated losses
to the dental service, but there is a large variability.
The National Dental Service is reassessing patients￿risk level on basis of certain risk
indicators. These indicators do not only pick up information contained in dental cost,
thus some patients receiving higher premiums actually have a lower dental cost relative
to peers in the same risk class. The typical patient leaving the insurance is someone
generating pro￿ts but still receiving a higher premium. Whether lapsation is due to an
adverse selection process depends on who is making the best assessment on future risk.
If the risk indicators go wrong for this group of patients, there is adverse selection,
but if the indicators actually pick up new risk not contained within realized dental
consumption, there is instead ine¢ ciency due to a communication problem between
dentist and patient.
[Table 8 about here]
9The pro￿t for each patient is calculated by subtracting the cost of his dental care (within the
contract) from the revenue he generates. The revenue consists of the premium paid by the patient,
plus a lump-sum of 200 SEK from the Public Insurance O¢ ce (F￿rs￿kringskassan). This lump-sum
corresponds to the average reimbursement from the public dental insurance scheme, covering all adults
in Sweden (see section 2). It is paid out to induce neutrality towards patients outside the private dental
insurance.
15A next issue is whether insurance dropout due to asymmetric updating has an eco-
nomic importance. To get an impression of the economic signi￿cance of the estimated
e⁄ects in model 3, table 3, the probability of opting out is ￿rst evaluated at the sample
mean of all included variables, and then compared to the probability when di⁄-prem is
increased and di⁄-cost reduced with one standard deviation, respectively, see table 8.
At the sample mean, the probability of dropping coverage is 6.9 percent. When di⁄-
prem is increased with one standard deviation the probability of opting out increases
with 55 percent￿ to 10.7 percent. A decrease in di⁄-cost with one standard deviation,
in turn, raises the probability of dropping coverage with 39 percent￿ to 9.6 percent.
Hence, the behavioral response to asymmetric learning on risk is substantial in the
present setting.
5 Discussion
There are many reasons why agents may fail to renew an insurance. The aim here
is to analyze how the decision is a⁄ected by new information on risk. Asymmetric
updating of information may lead agents￿to terminate their insurance. In the context
of a voluntary dental insurance, proxies for new information are related to the decision
to opt out. Past dental costs can be used as a proxy for private information due to
the set up of the insurance. A potential problem of using dental costs within the
insurance, to capture new information, is that agents with a skill to extract services
would be more likely to stay insured. These agents would have an unexpectedly high
dental consumption, without necessarily having a higher risk. Still, it is a signal of
higher future dental care consumption.
The results show that patients respond to economic circumstances in the decision
whether to leave the insurance. Patients are more prone to opt out when reclassi￿ed
into higher premium classes, or when they have an unexpectedly low dental consump-
tion. They are more responsive to higher premiums than to reduced expected costs.
If updating were symmetric, patients would not respond to a higher premium since it
would be regarded as a fair assessment of increased risk. The results indicate updating
on dental risk to be asymmetric, leading to partly di⁄erent information sets. New
16information obtained by the insurer can be inferred by observing premium changes,
but patients do not fully incorporate this public information. A higher premium is
viewed as a higher price on insurance contracts, rather than as a fair risk reassessment.
The results may follow from the insurer making an erroneous updating of the patients￿
risk. However, if the insurer￿ s updating does contain valid new information on risk,
the results are consistent with the literature on loss aversion and fairness of pricing,
where the outcomes of transactions are evaluated against a reference point. Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1986) ￿nd that price increases deviating from the reference price,
and not justi￿ed by increasing costs, are perceived as unfair by agents. Increased risk
is an abstract notion, and dentists may to have problems in communicating why a
contract has a higher expected cost. Higher premiums may therefore be viewed as
breaking the reference price of an insurance contract.
The cyclical pattern of dental care is not responsible for the asymmetric updat-
ing. If this was the case a high consumption within the insurance would increase the
probability of lapsing dental coverage; a pattern not observed in the data.
The fact that pre-cost is signi￿cant indicates that the impact of new information
to the agent accumulates over time. This result may, however, be due to the cyclical
pattern, giving pre-cost predictive power of the dental care needs in the upcoming
contract period. Indeed in table 1 it was seen that dental consumption four years back
has predictive power on current consumption. Naturally, agents not taking full account
of new signals can also be due to the cognitive process of updating information being
slow.
The consequences of asymmetric updating depend on which of the contracting parts
who has the advantage in updating. Within the present data, the question of whether
lapsation is due to a process of adverse selection cannot be determined. It can only be
noted that the risk assessment system used by the National Dental Service in V￿rmland
does about 30 percent better in predicting future dental cost, than do past dental costs.
Nonetheless, past dental consumption captures some parts of the variation in future
dental cost not captured by the risk classi￿cation.
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19Tables
Table 1: Regression of Dental Costs 2000 to 2001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Cost 00-01
Const. 1478 93.2 740 8.11 615 6.86 521 5.87
Cost 98-99 0.308 58.3 0.200 36.1 0.175 31.4
Cost 96-97 0.163 27.1
D gr2 97.5 0.87 78.6 0.71 75.4 0.69
D gr3 208 1.92 170 1.59 162 1.53
D gr4 394 3.98 325 3.34 290 3.01
D gr5 636 6.48 515 5.34 453 4.74
D gr6 907 9.32 737 7.7 648 6.84
D gr7 1247 12.9 995 10.5 850 9.0
D gr8 1626 17.0 1306 13.9 1124 12.0
D gr9 2040 20.9 1626 16.9 1391 14.5
D gr10 2262 22.6 1787 18.0 1505 15.2
D gr11 2495 24.1 1935 18.8 1648 16.1
D gr12 2920 25.2 2272 19.7 1933 16.8
D gr13 3421 24.6 2705 19.6 2291 16.7
D gr14 2869 14.8 2093 10.9 1669 8.8
D gr15 2900 8.8 2318 7.2 1893 5.9
D gr16 -306 -0.5 -886 -1.3 -1247 -1.9
N 36241 36241 36241 36241
Adj. R2 0.086 0.114 0.144 0.161
20Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Stdv. Min Max
Opt-out 5998 0.096 0.294 0 1
Pre-cost 5998 652 920 0 22999
Gender 5998 0.506 0.500 0 1
Age 5998 37.6 13.4 20 85
Di⁄-prem 5998 77.1 382 -3801 3570
Di⁄-cost 5998 454 1031 -22419 10642
21Table 3: Probit Estimates of Failure to Renew Insurance, I
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value
D gr2 0.237 1.38 0.244 1.43 0.254 1.48
D gr3 0.508 3.04 0.506 3.05 0.543 3.24
D gr4 0.549 3.37 0.573 3.54 0.598 3.66
D gr5 0.578 3.52 0.612 3.74 0.656 3.96
D gr6 0.598 3.57 0.622 3.71 0.705 4.15
D gr7 0.554 3.17 0.621 3.52 0.713 3.98
D gr8 0.858 4.74 0.868 4.72 1.052 5.60
D gr9 0.908 4.52 0.932 4.54 1.174 5.54
D gr10 1.241 5.47 1.185 5.10 1.554 6.47
D gr11 0.982 2.75 0.937 2.69 1.367 3.68
D gr12 1.279 3.17 1.199 2.91 1.794 4.21
D gr13 2.506 3.50 1.748 2.29 3.251 4.41
age -0.092 -9.29 -0.092 -9.42 -0.091 -9.11
age sqrt 9.50E-04 8.54 9.91E-04 9.15 9.30E-04 8.30
gender -0.133 -2.68 -0.126 -2.58 -0.139 -2.81
pre. cost -1.49E-04 -3.69 -2.04E-04 -3.83 -3.09E-04 -5.42
di⁄-prem 5.88E-04 9.87 6.27E-04 10.36
di⁄-cost -1.03E-04 -2.53 -1.71E-04 -3.97
const. -0.421 -1.34 -0.341 -1.12 -0.391 -1.24
fe clinics Yes Yes Yes
N 5998 5998 5998
LRI 0.161 0.136 0.165
Log L -1590.63 -1636.54 -1582.21
22Table 4: Probit Estimates of Failure to Renew Insurance, II
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coef t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value
D gr2 0.254 1.47 0.253 1.47 0.262 1.52
D gr3 0.542 3.24 0.542 3.24 0.555 3.31
D gr4 0.595 3.64 0.599 3.67 0.623 3.79
D gr5 0.650 3.92 0.647 3.87 0.607 3.62
D gr6 0.694 4.07 0.697 4.07 0.654 3.80
D gr7 0.696 3.87 0.703 3.88 0.661 3.63
D gr8 1.026 5.44 1.047 5.54 0.997 5.25
D gr9 1.142 5.35 1.197 5.61 1.053 4.84
D gr10 1.511 6.23 1.565 6.51 1.436 5.88
D gr11 1.291 3.44 1.398 3.80 1.234 3.28
D gr12 1.724 4.02 1.807 4.25 1.642 3.83
D gr13 2.970 3.82 3.138 4.20 2.995 3.95
age -0.091 -9.12 -0.091 -9.13 -0.091 -9.05
age sqrt 9.32E-04 8.32 9.29E-04 8.29 9.25E-04 8.26
gender -0.139 -2.81 -0.141 -2.84 -0.142 -2.87
pre. cost -3.09E-04 -5.41 -3.11E-04 -5.45 -3.05E-04 -5.40
di⁄-prem 6.27E-04 10.33
l di⁄-prem 6.05E-04 3.38
m di⁄-prem 6.83E-04 8.88
h di⁄-prem 5.27E-04 5.11
neg di⁄-prem 4.16E-04 2.37
pos di⁄-prem 6.63E-04 9.89
di⁄-cost -1.73E-04 -4.00 -1.74E-04 -4.03
l di⁄-cost -3.77E-04 -3.99
m di⁄-cost -1.72E-04 -3.47
h di⁄-cost -1.01E-04 -1.67
const. -0.398 -1.26 -0.368 -1.17 -0.365 -1.15
fe clinics Yes Yes Yes
N 5998 5998 5998
LRI 0.165 0.165 0.167
Log L -1581.44 -1581.43 -1578.73
23Table 5: Mean Pro￿t by Renewal Status
Pro￿t P-values for di⁄erences
Mean Stdv. t-test Mann-Whitney
Opt out No 68 663 0.013 <0.000
Yes 145 708
24Table 6: Mean Premium Change by Renewal Status
Di⁄-prem P-values for di⁄erences
Mean Stdv. t-test Mann-Whitney
Opt out No 60 348 <0.000 <0.000
Yes 241 592
25Table 7: Mean Pro￿t by Risk Reclassi￿cation
Pro￿t P-values for di⁄erences
Mean Stdv. t-test Mann-Whitney
Di⁄-prem Neg 229 746 <0.000 <0.000
0 132 603 <0.000 <0.000
Pos -109 725
Note: The p-values tests for di⁄erences in pro￿t against the
group for which di⁄-prem is positive.
26Table 8: Impact of Asymmetric Updating
Probability at Change Perc. Change
mean 1 stdv.
Di⁄-prem 0.069 0.107 0.038 54.7
Di⁄-cost 0.069 0.096 0.027 38.6
Note: The probability of buying insurance is evaluated
(i) at the sample mean of all variables, and (ii) when
di⁄-prem is increased, and di⁄-cost is decreased, with
one standard deviation, respectively.
27